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How to torpedo your career - Sankey style
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:01 pm
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:01 pm
I’ve been going down the rabbit hole of the legal case. It’s fascinating.
I – Attack of the SEC
The conference’s case is built on private contract law among the voluntary association of the members. There have been precedents where courts give wide latitude to private membership orgs such as the PGA, labor unions, etc. LSU is a voluntary member and thus, is subject to the conference’s regulations.
Another aspect of this is that it gives the SEC leg to stand on against the injunctions of state courts. The state court rulings force the conference to compromise its own internal rules agreed upon by the members (Boy Scouts of America v. Dale). Constitutional First Amendment claims generally outrank state contract or state injunction orders under the Supremacy Clause. State rulings then create jurisdictional friction which federal courts have to sort out, giving the federal case precedence.
The conference can argue that the players are incidental beneficiaries (benefit secondarily thus, no right to sue) as opposed to intended beneficiaries (explicitly spelled out in the contract).
Some people feel that this is an escalation strategy to force a settlement with LSU whereby LSU is brought to heel. This is being widely broadcast and feels ominous in an effort to scare LSUs B.O.S., a pressure campaign.
II – It ain’t no fun when the rabbit’s got the gun
On the whole, the case was a massive legal miscalculation by the conference. Then Sankey decided to double and triple down on stupid.
The case could be summarily thrown out based on the Anti-Injunction Act which prohibits a federal court from issuing an injunction to stay ongoing state court proceedings. Similarly, the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine allows federal courts to abstain from hearing a case when there is a parallel, concurrent state court proceeding and "wise judicial administration" counsels in favor of letting the state court handle it. Federal courts heavily disfavor creating such contradictory rulings, instead working to preserve comity.
If Axon feels like the SEC's filing is forum shopping to escape an unfavorable judicial climate in Louisiana, she might dismiss. It turns out federal judges don’t like being used as political pawns.
One of the biggest problems with the conference’s stance is the hypocrisy. In state court, the SEC claims it is a non-profit administrative association whose rules are voluntary internal agreements among member schools. In federal court, they claim that they are discrete enough that their First Amendment right to expressive association has been violated. This special pleading is likely not going to be lost on a federal judge.
A glaring problem for the conference is that their case hinges on being forced to accept former professional players yet, the conference can’t adequately define what that means in realistic terms. Signing a contract but not doing anything of substance does not materially constitute being more of a “professional player” than one who actually suited up, saw action and was paid. Moreover, claiming authority to hand down sweeping eligibility bans or conference-level sanctions while simultaneously acknowledging during sworn testimony a lack of familiarity with the specific timelines, contract details, or individual circumstances of the players involved makes the enforcement look punitive rather than procedural. In an era where college athletes earn millions through NIL and sign corporate deals, attempting to ban someone simply because they signed a pro contract or appeared on an ex-pro roster—while claiming you can't clearly define the distinction—is legally indefensible. Judge Jorden directly called out the conference's logic in open court, stating that treating a kid who took $190 in gas money as an "extinct professional" while college players make millions in NIL "doesn't make any rhyme or reason".
Trinidad Chambliss is a known ineligible player yet, the SEC has not punished Ole Miss for playing him. When exceptions—like medical waivers or hardship exemptions—are selectively validated while ex-pro cases are flatly rejected, it creates an obvious double standard.
This leads to the criticism that the conference is acting vindictively towards LSU. Targeted emergency timing, forcing LSU to abstain from a vote and legal retaliation look like bad faith negotiating and arbitrary enforcement. Inexplicably, the conference moving forward despite the fact that LSU never added the legal players to the roster looks absolutely biased.
Another element of the case is that the conference has levied the charge that LSU actively engaged in activity contrary to the conference’s rules, i.e. recruiting ineligible players. How does Sankey know this? So far there have been zero subpoenas, zero evidence and it appears that they are basing their entire charge of "recruiting pros" on public roster moves, local sports reporting, and the fact that LSU filed court papers attempting to clear these players under state TROs. Unless a rule explicitly forbids communication—which SEC bylaws do not—a head coach talking to a former player who has active court-ordered injunctive relief to play college football is basic, lawful roster management.
Worse for Sankey is that DQ Wright and his agent have both repeatedly said multiple schools were contacting Wright. Additionally, the Ole Miss AD admitted they were pursuing those players. Trying to frame LSUs contact with the players as a secret, malicious "pro-recruiting conspiracy" is just detached from reality. Everyone in college football was pursuing these players because a state judge granted an injunction creating an open market.
In fact, Wright and Zxavian Harris were not even the first players to sue for eligibility. They rode the crest of a massive, nationwide legal wave that started earlier in the summer, sparked by 450 athletes. How can LSU be guilty of a conspiratorial flaunting of SEC rules when the floodgates had already been opened (like AJ Storr at Ole Miss, Dug McDaniel at Memphis, and Jalen Washington at Vanderbilt)? The real explosion happened on July 31, when federal Judge Sweeney in Colorado issued a massive, class-wide preliminary injunction in Wisne v. NCAA. Her order declared that the NCAA had to grant a fifth year of eligibility to all Division I athletes from the 2022 class across the country, citing antitrust violations.
It is laughably inconsistent to say that the conference is trying to protect younger players when the class of 2022 players had to vie for playing time against 6th and 7th year Covid superseniors which is the very reason why the state courts intervened on behalf of the class of ’22. Why isn’t the NCAA/SEC advocating for them?
I – Attack of the SEC
The conference’s case is built on private contract law among the voluntary association of the members. There have been precedents where courts give wide latitude to private membership orgs such as the PGA, labor unions, etc. LSU is a voluntary member and thus, is subject to the conference’s regulations.
Another aspect of this is that it gives the SEC leg to stand on against the injunctions of state courts. The state court rulings force the conference to compromise its own internal rules agreed upon by the members (Boy Scouts of America v. Dale). Constitutional First Amendment claims generally outrank state contract or state injunction orders under the Supremacy Clause. State rulings then create jurisdictional friction which federal courts have to sort out, giving the federal case precedence.
The conference can argue that the players are incidental beneficiaries (benefit secondarily thus, no right to sue) as opposed to intended beneficiaries (explicitly spelled out in the contract).
Some people feel that this is an escalation strategy to force a settlement with LSU whereby LSU is brought to heel. This is being widely broadcast and feels ominous in an effort to scare LSUs B.O.S., a pressure campaign.
II – It ain’t no fun when the rabbit’s got the gun
On the whole, the case was a massive legal miscalculation by the conference. Then Sankey decided to double and triple down on stupid.
The case could be summarily thrown out based on the Anti-Injunction Act which prohibits a federal court from issuing an injunction to stay ongoing state court proceedings. Similarly, the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine allows federal courts to abstain from hearing a case when there is a parallel, concurrent state court proceeding and "wise judicial administration" counsels in favor of letting the state court handle it. Federal courts heavily disfavor creating such contradictory rulings, instead working to preserve comity.
If Axon feels like the SEC's filing is forum shopping to escape an unfavorable judicial climate in Louisiana, she might dismiss. It turns out federal judges don’t like being used as political pawns.
One of the biggest problems with the conference’s stance is the hypocrisy. In state court, the SEC claims it is a non-profit administrative association whose rules are voluntary internal agreements among member schools. In federal court, they claim that they are discrete enough that their First Amendment right to expressive association has been violated. This special pleading is likely not going to be lost on a federal judge.
A glaring problem for the conference is that their case hinges on being forced to accept former professional players yet, the conference can’t adequately define what that means in realistic terms. Signing a contract but not doing anything of substance does not materially constitute being more of a “professional player” than one who actually suited up, saw action and was paid. Moreover, claiming authority to hand down sweeping eligibility bans or conference-level sanctions while simultaneously acknowledging during sworn testimony a lack of familiarity with the specific timelines, contract details, or individual circumstances of the players involved makes the enforcement look punitive rather than procedural. In an era where college athletes earn millions through NIL and sign corporate deals, attempting to ban someone simply because they signed a pro contract or appeared on an ex-pro roster—while claiming you can't clearly define the distinction—is legally indefensible. Judge Jorden directly called out the conference's logic in open court, stating that treating a kid who took $190 in gas money as an "extinct professional" while college players make millions in NIL "doesn't make any rhyme or reason".
Trinidad Chambliss is a known ineligible player yet, the SEC has not punished Ole Miss for playing him. When exceptions—like medical waivers or hardship exemptions—are selectively validated while ex-pro cases are flatly rejected, it creates an obvious double standard.
This leads to the criticism that the conference is acting vindictively towards LSU. Targeted emergency timing, forcing LSU to abstain from a vote and legal retaliation look like bad faith negotiating and arbitrary enforcement. Inexplicably, the conference moving forward despite the fact that LSU never added the legal players to the roster looks absolutely biased.
Another element of the case is that the conference has levied the charge that LSU actively engaged in activity contrary to the conference’s rules, i.e. recruiting ineligible players. How does Sankey know this? So far there have been zero subpoenas, zero evidence and it appears that they are basing their entire charge of "recruiting pros" on public roster moves, local sports reporting, and the fact that LSU filed court papers attempting to clear these players under state TROs. Unless a rule explicitly forbids communication—which SEC bylaws do not—a head coach talking to a former player who has active court-ordered injunctive relief to play college football is basic, lawful roster management.
Worse for Sankey is that DQ Wright and his agent have both repeatedly said multiple schools were contacting Wright. Additionally, the Ole Miss AD admitted they were pursuing those players. Trying to frame LSUs contact with the players as a secret, malicious "pro-recruiting conspiracy" is just detached from reality. Everyone in college football was pursuing these players because a state judge granted an injunction creating an open market.
In fact, Wright and Zxavian Harris were not even the first players to sue for eligibility. They rode the crest of a massive, nationwide legal wave that started earlier in the summer, sparked by 450 athletes. How can LSU be guilty of a conspiratorial flaunting of SEC rules when the floodgates had already been opened (like AJ Storr at Ole Miss, Dug McDaniel at Memphis, and Jalen Washington at Vanderbilt)? The real explosion happened on July 31, when federal Judge Sweeney in Colorado issued a massive, class-wide preliminary injunction in Wisne v. NCAA. Her order declared that the NCAA had to grant a fifth year of eligibility to all Division I athletes from the 2022 class across the country, citing antitrust violations.
It is laughably inconsistent to say that the conference is trying to protect younger players when the class of 2022 players had to vie for playing time against 6th and 7th year Covid superseniors which is the very reason why the state courts intervened on behalf of the class of ’22. Why isn’t the NCAA/SEC advocating for them?
5
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:01 pm to somethingdifferent
III – Be careful what you wish for
Ironically, in suing LSU, the conference has opened itself up to countersuit. Something like this could happen on several grounds. One of those avenues is Federal Antitrust Counterclaims (Sherman Act Section 1), as in group boycott and horizontal restraint of trade. Antitrust violations carry mandatory treble damages (triple the actual financial damages) plus mandatory attorneys' fees. If LSU countersues under antitrust law and proves the conference's emergency rules illegally restrained the market for athlete labor and damaged LSU’s commercial capabilities, the SEC could be facing hundreds of millions of dollars in liability—payable directly to LSU.
Another route is Tortious Interference with Contract and Prospective Economic Advantage. The claim would be that the SEC is actively interfering with existing state-sanctioned NIL agreements, enrollment contracts, and institutional operations. Punitive damages for intentional tortious interference can be devastating.
Third, LSU could claim Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Rushing through an emergency 15-0 vote on a Monday while forcing LSU to abstain, filing a surprise lawsuit against LSU's president and coach in another state three days later, and threatening expulsion for obeying a valid court order is a textbook breach of good faith. This voids the SEC’s legal high ground and gives LSU direct grounds to claim material breach of the conference compact.
The damage would not be all financial. If LSU or the state of Louisiana files broad counterclaims, the SEC loses its ability to hide behind private conference discussions. LSU’s legal team will obtain full discovery access to every email, text message, memo, and internal exchange between Greg Sankey, SEC staff, and the other 15 university presidents leading up to the 15-0 vote. Every private conversation about "targeting LSU" or "making an example of Kiffin" will be dragged into public court records. Sankey’s multi-hour disaster in Baton Rouge was just an initial hearing. Formal depositions under full federal and state discovery rules would force Sankey, conference attorneys, and rival SEC athletic directors onto the record under oath, exposing the internal mechanics and political posturing of the league. Last, there would be the destruction of centralized authority and the specter that state law can indeed exert some influence over the conference.
For LSU to win a massive federal antitrust counterclaim, they must prove the SEC’s rules are an illegal restraint on a commercial market. Under the Supreme Court's Alston ruling, while economic pay caps are illegal under antitrust law, leagues are still allowed some room to define what constitutes the legitimate product they are selling. However, if the SEC convinces a federal judge that drawing a line at signing an NFL contract is a non-commercial, product-defining rule rather than an economic boycott, the conference could potentially survive the Sherman Act challenge.
As if all of this weren’t enough of a circus, the College Football Playoff threw their hat in the ring when they publicly issued support for the conference. In doing so, they can now be added to the LA TRO. This was a colossal tactical blunder because now it is no longer a neutral third party. If LSU or any other school plays a court-eligible athlete who was granted a TRO, and the CFP committee attempts to penalize, rank down, or exclude that team from the 12-team playoff, the CFP is in direct contempt of state injunctions. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the moment distinct entities (the conferences + the CFP) coordinate to exclude individuals from a market, it’s a textbook horizontal restraint of trade. Instead of letting Greg Sankey take all the legal arrows in Baton Rouge and Birmingham, the CFP leadership voluntarily walked right into the crosshairs of state judges who have zero patience for administrative coordination meant to circumvent court orders.
It should not go unnoticed that the university presidents are not immune to legal exposure. The damage they opened themselves up to includes Exposure to Contempt of Court (Violating the LA TRO/Injunction) and the "Notice & Concert" Rule. Every SEC president received formal notice of Judge Jorden’s order. If the board of presidents votes to strip LSU’s revenue distribution, issue a coach suspension, or expel LSU because LSU relied on that court order, each voting president can be named individually or institutionally in a Show-Cause Order for Contempt of Court.
Sanctions for willful contempt can include severe civil fines levied against the institutions, payment of LSU's legal fees, and in extreme cases of intentional defiance, personal fines or coercion against university officials. For Federal Antitrust & Trade Violations (Sherman Act Exposure), the financial risk becomes overwhelming. When 15 university presidents sit in a room and vote 15-0 to ban certain athletes from working in their market and threaten to destroy a competitor school's 50% budget for hiring them, they are engaging in a classic horizontal agreement among horizontal competitors; Group Boycott, Joint and Several Liability and Treble Damages. Antitrust damages are automatically tripled by law. A $100 million economic damage claim against LSU turns into a $300 million judgment that the other 15 member schools would have to pay out of their own institutional budgets.
IV – The road less traveled
Ultimately, there is virtually zero winning legal precedent for the conference’s strategy. Supreme Court precedent (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, Dallas v. Stanglin) explicitly draws the line at commercial entities. A multi-billion-dollar athletic enterprise whose primary activity is selling television broadcast rights, corporate sponsorships, and stadium tickets is a commercial market actor, not an ideological association. Courts have routinely rejected attempts by commercial businesses or sports leagues to claim First Amendment immunity to bypass labor, employment, or antitrust laws.
The SEC's theory attempts to frame antitrust and eligibility rules as "protected speech." However, in NCAA v. Alston (2021) and decades of professional sports litigation (such as Radovich v. NFL or Haywood v. NBA), federal courts have repeatedly ruled that sports leagues cannot hide behind administrative "amateurism" or internal association rules to enforce anti-competitive market bans.
By filing in federal court against state officials (LSU's President, AD, and Board of Supervisors), the SEC is attempting to use Ex parte Young to bypass Louisiana's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. However, precedent dictates that federal courts will not invoke Ex parte Young when a plaintiff is simply trying to invalidate or block a parallel state court’s valid order. Federal courts routinely apply the Younger or Colorado River abstention doctrines, ruling that federal courts should not interfere with ongoing state court evidentiary proceedings involving state institutions.
Altogether, the conference is taking a First Amendment doctrine designed to protect political groups and trying to stretch it into an absolute shield for a corporate sports conference to ignore state laws, override state court injunctions, and expel founding members. Higher courts have never accepted this argument in the context of commercial sports governance, making the strategy an unprecedented legal gamble.
Ironically, in suing LSU, the conference has opened itself up to countersuit. Something like this could happen on several grounds. One of those avenues is Federal Antitrust Counterclaims (Sherman Act Section 1), as in group boycott and horizontal restraint of trade. Antitrust violations carry mandatory treble damages (triple the actual financial damages) plus mandatory attorneys' fees. If LSU countersues under antitrust law and proves the conference's emergency rules illegally restrained the market for athlete labor and damaged LSU’s commercial capabilities, the SEC could be facing hundreds of millions of dollars in liability—payable directly to LSU.
Another route is Tortious Interference with Contract and Prospective Economic Advantage. The claim would be that the SEC is actively interfering with existing state-sanctioned NIL agreements, enrollment contracts, and institutional operations. Punitive damages for intentional tortious interference can be devastating.
Third, LSU could claim Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Rushing through an emergency 15-0 vote on a Monday while forcing LSU to abstain, filing a surprise lawsuit against LSU's president and coach in another state three days later, and threatening expulsion for obeying a valid court order is a textbook breach of good faith. This voids the SEC’s legal high ground and gives LSU direct grounds to claim material breach of the conference compact.
The damage would not be all financial. If LSU or the state of Louisiana files broad counterclaims, the SEC loses its ability to hide behind private conference discussions. LSU’s legal team will obtain full discovery access to every email, text message, memo, and internal exchange between Greg Sankey, SEC staff, and the other 15 university presidents leading up to the 15-0 vote. Every private conversation about "targeting LSU" or "making an example of Kiffin" will be dragged into public court records. Sankey’s multi-hour disaster in Baton Rouge was just an initial hearing. Formal depositions under full federal and state discovery rules would force Sankey, conference attorneys, and rival SEC athletic directors onto the record under oath, exposing the internal mechanics and political posturing of the league. Last, there would be the destruction of centralized authority and the specter that state law can indeed exert some influence over the conference.
For LSU to win a massive federal antitrust counterclaim, they must prove the SEC’s rules are an illegal restraint on a commercial market. Under the Supreme Court's Alston ruling, while economic pay caps are illegal under antitrust law, leagues are still allowed some room to define what constitutes the legitimate product they are selling. However, if the SEC convinces a federal judge that drawing a line at signing an NFL contract is a non-commercial, product-defining rule rather than an economic boycott, the conference could potentially survive the Sherman Act challenge.
As if all of this weren’t enough of a circus, the College Football Playoff threw their hat in the ring when they publicly issued support for the conference. In doing so, they can now be added to the LA TRO. This was a colossal tactical blunder because now it is no longer a neutral third party. If LSU or any other school plays a court-eligible athlete who was granted a TRO, and the CFP committee attempts to penalize, rank down, or exclude that team from the 12-team playoff, the CFP is in direct contempt of state injunctions. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the moment distinct entities (the conferences + the CFP) coordinate to exclude individuals from a market, it’s a textbook horizontal restraint of trade. Instead of letting Greg Sankey take all the legal arrows in Baton Rouge and Birmingham, the CFP leadership voluntarily walked right into the crosshairs of state judges who have zero patience for administrative coordination meant to circumvent court orders.
It should not go unnoticed that the university presidents are not immune to legal exposure. The damage they opened themselves up to includes Exposure to Contempt of Court (Violating the LA TRO/Injunction) and the "Notice & Concert" Rule. Every SEC president received formal notice of Judge Jorden’s order. If the board of presidents votes to strip LSU’s revenue distribution, issue a coach suspension, or expel LSU because LSU relied on that court order, each voting president can be named individually or institutionally in a Show-Cause Order for Contempt of Court.
Sanctions for willful contempt can include severe civil fines levied against the institutions, payment of LSU's legal fees, and in extreme cases of intentional defiance, personal fines or coercion against university officials. For Federal Antitrust & Trade Violations (Sherman Act Exposure), the financial risk becomes overwhelming. When 15 university presidents sit in a room and vote 15-0 to ban certain athletes from working in their market and threaten to destroy a competitor school's 50% budget for hiring them, they are engaging in a classic horizontal agreement among horizontal competitors; Group Boycott, Joint and Several Liability and Treble Damages. Antitrust damages are automatically tripled by law. A $100 million economic damage claim against LSU turns into a $300 million judgment that the other 15 member schools would have to pay out of their own institutional budgets.
IV – The road less traveled
Ultimately, there is virtually zero winning legal precedent for the conference’s strategy. Supreme Court precedent (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, Dallas v. Stanglin) explicitly draws the line at commercial entities. A multi-billion-dollar athletic enterprise whose primary activity is selling television broadcast rights, corporate sponsorships, and stadium tickets is a commercial market actor, not an ideological association. Courts have routinely rejected attempts by commercial businesses or sports leagues to claim First Amendment immunity to bypass labor, employment, or antitrust laws.
The SEC's theory attempts to frame antitrust and eligibility rules as "protected speech." However, in NCAA v. Alston (2021) and decades of professional sports litigation (such as Radovich v. NFL or Haywood v. NBA), federal courts have repeatedly ruled that sports leagues cannot hide behind administrative "amateurism" or internal association rules to enforce anti-competitive market bans.
By filing in federal court against state officials (LSU's President, AD, and Board of Supervisors), the SEC is attempting to use Ex parte Young to bypass Louisiana's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. However, precedent dictates that federal courts will not invoke Ex parte Young when a plaintiff is simply trying to invalidate or block a parallel state court’s valid order. Federal courts routinely apply the Younger or Colorado River abstention doctrines, ruling that federal courts should not interfere with ongoing state court evidentiary proceedings involving state institutions.
Altogether, the conference is taking a First Amendment doctrine designed to protect political groups and trying to stretch it into an absolute shield for a corporate sports conference to ignore state laws, override state court injunctions, and expel founding members. Higher courts have never accepted this argument in the context of commercial sports governance, making the strategy an unprecedented legal gamble.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:02 pm to somethingdifferent
V – How do I look?
The bottom line is that win or lose, the SEC loses.
Scenario 1: SEC wins in court, but suffers immense Pyrrhic damage. Even if a federal judge grants them a narrow ruling on association governance or First Amendment rights, the victory will carry a devastating cost; Exposure of Internal Records, Destruction of the Conference Compact, Public Perception. They will look like corporate bullies who got humiliated on a Baton Rouge witness stand and responded by trying to kick out a flagship program.
Scenario 2: They back down or settle, destroying league credibility. Their bluff will have been exposed.
By treating a routine state-court eligibility dispute as an existential threat to league authority, Sankey hurtled the conference into the void of a no-win position. They either have to blow up their own founding partnership or retreat with their legal credibility in tatters.
Not lost in all of the fracas is that the SEC should have been knocking on the NCAAs door to create a workaround for the 5 for 5 rollout fiasco instead of conducting a witch hunt for Lane Kiffin. In failing to do so, they ended up addressing the effect, not the cause. This is likely because the SEC realizes The NCAA Has No Real Power Left. In 2026, the NCAA is essentially an administrative shell that has lost nearly every major antitrust and eligibility lawsuit brought against it (Alston, state AG injunctions, and now Wisne v. NCAA). The SEC and Big Ten run college football. Knocking on Charlie Baker’s door in Indianapolis to "ask for a workaround" yields little result because the NCAA cannot enforce nationwide rules without getting sued and losing in federal court. This, of course, underscores the need for a collective bargaining agreement.
VI – In this corner, wearing black and blue, Greg Sankey. In the other corner, wearing purple and gold, Jeff Landry.
In a political and institutional showdown, Governor Jeff Landry holds structural leverage over a conference commissioner like Greg Sankey. Landry can threaten the SEC with state antitrust legislation, tax status reviews, public university board overhauls, and state court subpoenas that directly target conference operations. If federal courts attempt to enforce orders that conflict with Louisiana state court preliminary injunctions, Landry can easily turn this into a sovereign state rights fight. On the other hand, Sankey represents 16 distinct university presidents who are deeply risk-averse. The moment Landry turns the dispute into a broader war—threatening state funding, legislative oversight, or multi-state litigation—the other 15 university presidents will start pressuring Sankey to settle rather than let Louisiana state politics burn down conference stability.
By stupidly adding Murrill to the docket, Sankey handed the Louisiana AG's Office full legal standing to go nuclear on the SEC. Murrill can now unleash the full investigatory and litigation apparatus of the State of Louisiana directly against the conference. She can file state-level antitrust actions, initiate consumer protection inquiries, launch investigations into SEC revenue distributions, and issue broad subpoenas for every piece of internal SEC correspondence regarding the emergency 15-0 vote.
VII – Meet the real boss, same as the old boss.
While politicians, commissioners, and coaches fight on camera, Disney (ESPN/ABC) and Fox Sports hold the real power behind the scenes. Disney and Fox didn't sign multi-billion-dollar broadcast deals to buy administrative purity or 1990s amateurism rules; they bought high-rating television inventory. A brand like LSU (especially under Lane Kiffin) competing in prime-time windows is a massive driver of advertising revenue and subscriber retention.
The SEC threatening nuclear options like budget-slashing fines, head coach suspensions, or conference expulsion threatens the value of the television product. In the present, drama drives engagement in sports broadcasting but if the SEC degrades one of its marquee brands or drags the league into multi-year antitrust discovery that jeopardizes playoff matchups, network executives are unlikely to turn a blind eye to that. When broadcast networks notice that a conference leadership dispute is devaluing its media rights, C-suite executives might tell their secretary to get Sankey on the horn pronto to resolve the issue out of court, protect the playoff inventory, and stop destroying product value on cable news. Anyone who thinks Jimmy Pitaro, Burke Magnus, and Bob Iger are sitting in Burbank passively watching Greg Sankey set fire to the SEC's media value doesn't understand how multi-billion-dollar sports broadcasting works.
Disney isn't just an interested observer; they are the landlord. Greg Sankey thinks he is fighting for the administrative soul of the SEC. Jeff Landry thinks he is fighting for state sovereignty. But Disney owns the stage both men are standing on. They own the SEC Network, hold exclusive 10-year rights to the entire conference package through 2034, and control the $7.8 billion College Football Playoff ecosystem. Ratings rise when LSU plays under the threat of emergency sanctions or after halftime comments from Kiffin. Disney is happy to monetize the drama while it remains purely promotional. Disney owns the 12-team CFP broadcast rights. If the SEC attempts to block a 10- or 11-win LSU team from the postseason because of court-cleared players, Disney loses tens of millions in playoff ad revenue. They will not allow conference administrative politics to sabotage a prime-time playoff matchup.
VIII – Where do we go from here?
It’s entirely possible that all of this is coordinated chaos in order to get congress to act. Disney potentially stepping in helps Sankey pivot the narrative away from his courtroom loss toward Washington. Sankey and the conference presidents will jointly state: "This legal uncertainty proves why Congress must act immediately to provide a unified federal standard for college athletics." NCAA President Charlie Baker explicitly stated after the July 31 class-action ruling that the legal upheaval proves why Congress must pass a federal antitrust exemption for college sports. By refusing to create easy "workarounds" or grant waivers for the 2022 class, sports leaders deliberately allow the system to look unmanageable. They want the spectacle of state courts, cut NFL players, and rogue rosters to convince federal lawmakers to step in and give them statutory immunity.
Then there would be nothing stopping Disney. They would exert supreme influence over the sport and the players would once again be relegated to little more than corporate slaves. It would be Disney/Fox and the Master Control Program running things from on high.
The bottom line is that win or lose, the SEC loses.
Scenario 1: SEC wins in court, but suffers immense Pyrrhic damage. Even if a federal judge grants them a narrow ruling on association governance or First Amendment rights, the victory will carry a devastating cost; Exposure of Internal Records, Destruction of the Conference Compact, Public Perception. They will look like corporate bullies who got humiliated on a Baton Rouge witness stand and responded by trying to kick out a flagship program.
Scenario 2: They back down or settle, destroying league credibility. Their bluff will have been exposed.
By treating a routine state-court eligibility dispute as an existential threat to league authority, Sankey hurtled the conference into the void of a no-win position. They either have to blow up their own founding partnership or retreat with their legal credibility in tatters.
Not lost in all of the fracas is that the SEC should have been knocking on the NCAAs door to create a workaround for the 5 for 5 rollout fiasco instead of conducting a witch hunt for Lane Kiffin. In failing to do so, they ended up addressing the effect, not the cause. This is likely because the SEC realizes The NCAA Has No Real Power Left. In 2026, the NCAA is essentially an administrative shell that has lost nearly every major antitrust and eligibility lawsuit brought against it (Alston, state AG injunctions, and now Wisne v. NCAA). The SEC and Big Ten run college football. Knocking on Charlie Baker’s door in Indianapolis to "ask for a workaround" yields little result because the NCAA cannot enforce nationwide rules without getting sued and losing in federal court. This, of course, underscores the need for a collective bargaining agreement.
VI – In this corner, wearing black and blue, Greg Sankey. In the other corner, wearing purple and gold, Jeff Landry.
In a political and institutional showdown, Governor Jeff Landry holds structural leverage over a conference commissioner like Greg Sankey. Landry can threaten the SEC with state antitrust legislation, tax status reviews, public university board overhauls, and state court subpoenas that directly target conference operations. If federal courts attempt to enforce orders that conflict with Louisiana state court preliminary injunctions, Landry can easily turn this into a sovereign state rights fight. On the other hand, Sankey represents 16 distinct university presidents who are deeply risk-averse. The moment Landry turns the dispute into a broader war—threatening state funding, legislative oversight, or multi-state litigation—the other 15 university presidents will start pressuring Sankey to settle rather than let Louisiana state politics burn down conference stability.
By stupidly adding Murrill to the docket, Sankey handed the Louisiana AG's Office full legal standing to go nuclear on the SEC. Murrill can now unleash the full investigatory and litigation apparatus of the State of Louisiana directly against the conference. She can file state-level antitrust actions, initiate consumer protection inquiries, launch investigations into SEC revenue distributions, and issue broad subpoenas for every piece of internal SEC correspondence regarding the emergency 15-0 vote.
VII – Meet the real boss, same as the old boss.
While politicians, commissioners, and coaches fight on camera, Disney (ESPN/ABC) and Fox Sports hold the real power behind the scenes. Disney and Fox didn't sign multi-billion-dollar broadcast deals to buy administrative purity or 1990s amateurism rules; they bought high-rating television inventory. A brand like LSU (especially under Lane Kiffin) competing in prime-time windows is a massive driver of advertising revenue and subscriber retention.
The SEC threatening nuclear options like budget-slashing fines, head coach suspensions, or conference expulsion threatens the value of the television product. In the present, drama drives engagement in sports broadcasting but if the SEC degrades one of its marquee brands or drags the league into multi-year antitrust discovery that jeopardizes playoff matchups, network executives are unlikely to turn a blind eye to that. When broadcast networks notice that a conference leadership dispute is devaluing its media rights, C-suite executives might tell their secretary to get Sankey on the horn pronto to resolve the issue out of court, protect the playoff inventory, and stop destroying product value on cable news. Anyone who thinks Jimmy Pitaro, Burke Magnus, and Bob Iger are sitting in Burbank passively watching Greg Sankey set fire to the SEC's media value doesn't understand how multi-billion-dollar sports broadcasting works.
Disney isn't just an interested observer; they are the landlord. Greg Sankey thinks he is fighting for the administrative soul of the SEC. Jeff Landry thinks he is fighting for state sovereignty. But Disney owns the stage both men are standing on. They own the SEC Network, hold exclusive 10-year rights to the entire conference package through 2034, and control the $7.8 billion College Football Playoff ecosystem. Ratings rise when LSU plays under the threat of emergency sanctions or after halftime comments from Kiffin. Disney is happy to monetize the drama while it remains purely promotional. Disney owns the 12-team CFP broadcast rights. If the SEC attempts to block a 10- or 11-win LSU team from the postseason because of court-cleared players, Disney loses tens of millions in playoff ad revenue. They will not allow conference administrative politics to sabotage a prime-time playoff matchup.
VIII – Where do we go from here?
It’s entirely possible that all of this is coordinated chaos in order to get congress to act. Disney potentially stepping in helps Sankey pivot the narrative away from his courtroom loss toward Washington. Sankey and the conference presidents will jointly state: "This legal uncertainty proves why Congress must act immediately to provide a unified federal standard for college athletics." NCAA President Charlie Baker explicitly stated after the July 31 class-action ruling that the legal upheaval proves why Congress must pass a federal antitrust exemption for college sports. By refusing to create easy "workarounds" or grant waivers for the 2022 class, sports leaders deliberately allow the system to look unmanageable. They want the spectacle of state courts, cut NFL players, and rogue rosters to convince federal lawmakers to step in and give them statutory immunity.
Then there would be nothing stopping Disney. They would exert supreme influence over the sport and the players would once again be relegated to little more than corporate slaves. It would be Disney/Fox and the Master Control Program running things from on high.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:02 pm to somethingdifferent
IX – Congrats, you just played yourself.
For nearly 100 years, the NCAA and its power conferences controlled labor prices, restricted mobility, and enforced amateurism under the guise of "preserving the product." When the Supreme Court unanimously dismantled that framework in NCAA v. Alston (2021), Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that the NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America. The current litigation isn't an anomaly; it is the natural, inevitable outcome of a multi-billion-dollar commercial market suddenly being forced to comply with federal antitrust law. When state leadership—from governors to state attorneys general—step in to protect their public universities, local athletes, and regional economic engines, it ceases to be a simple sports dispute. It transforms into a constitutional debate over state sovereignty, the Tenth Amendment, and the limits of private corporate authority over state entities.
It is one of the most remarkable legal confrontations in modern American business history. This litigation brings together several powerful institutional forces in a single courtroom battle: public sovereignty (State of Louisiana/AG/Governor, corporate broadcast (Disney/Fox Media Rights), capital market (Millions of dollars in NIL Collectives/Sponsors and private cartel (SEC Office & 15 Presidents).
The NIL corporate stakeholders aren't going to sit idly by while their product is being sidelined by out of touch school presidents and a corporate bureaucrat in Sankey. The SEC's attempts to treat player eligibility as an internal "amateurism" debate ignore the reality that these athletes are multi-million-dollar commercial assets. These deals involve contractual agreements between players, corporate sponsors, state collectives, and national brands. Banning eligible players disrupts a multi-million-dollar economic ecosystem, opening up significant legal risk for conference leadership.
In tort law, abstract harms are hard to quantify. But a signed, executed seven-figure NIL agreement from a collective or national brand provides a concrete, liquidated monetary metric for damages. If Greg Sankey forces LSU or any other program to keep a court-cleared athlete off the field, the affected player—and the corporate entities backing them—can sue the SEC for the exact dollar amount lost, multiplied by three under antitrust law.
Corporate brands are not likely to absorb heavy losses. When a local bank, auto group, or national apparel brand executes a six- or seven-figure agreement with an elite transfer player, they are paying for on-field exposure, Saturday television broadcasts on ABC, and activation during game weeks. Corporate legal teams will not sit back and write off a million-dollar loss to appease a conference commissioner's ideological feud. They could file claims for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations directly against the SEC and the individual university presidents who voted for the ban. In fact, Louisiana State law explicitly forbids any out-of-state athletic association, conference, or governing body from restricting, penalizing, or interfering with an athlete's ability to earn market-value NIL compensation while enrolled at a Louisiana institution. By passing an emergency rule aimed at preventing these athletes from taking the field—and thereby invalidating their active NIL deals—Sankey and the SEC presidents are in direct, intentional violation of Louisiana statutory law.
There has basically never been a single legal collision in American history that hits every single one of these hyper-specific pressure points simultaneously. A single legal battle where individual million-dollar labor assets, multi-billion-dollar broadcast networks, sovereign state governments, and a giant private corporate cartel are all simultaneously suing, countersuing, and threatening nuclear structural options is essentially unprecedented in American business history and jurisprudence.
By throwing a juvenile temper tantrum, Sankey has become the flashpoint for a cascade of events that could end in his own career demise and potentially the destruction of the thing he’s trying to protect.
For nearly 100 years, the NCAA and its power conferences controlled labor prices, restricted mobility, and enforced amateurism under the guise of "preserving the product." When the Supreme Court unanimously dismantled that framework in NCAA v. Alston (2021), Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that the NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America. The current litigation isn't an anomaly; it is the natural, inevitable outcome of a multi-billion-dollar commercial market suddenly being forced to comply with federal antitrust law. When state leadership—from governors to state attorneys general—step in to protect their public universities, local athletes, and regional economic engines, it ceases to be a simple sports dispute. It transforms into a constitutional debate over state sovereignty, the Tenth Amendment, and the limits of private corporate authority over state entities.
It is one of the most remarkable legal confrontations in modern American business history. This litigation brings together several powerful institutional forces in a single courtroom battle: public sovereignty (State of Louisiana/AG/Governor, corporate broadcast (Disney/Fox Media Rights), capital market (Millions of dollars in NIL Collectives/Sponsors and private cartel (SEC Office & 15 Presidents).
The NIL corporate stakeholders aren't going to sit idly by while their product is being sidelined by out of touch school presidents and a corporate bureaucrat in Sankey. The SEC's attempts to treat player eligibility as an internal "amateurism" debate ignore the reality that these athletes are multi-million-dollar commercial assets. These deals involve contractual agreements between players, corporate sponsors, state collectives, and national brands. Banning eligible players disrupts a multi-million-dollar economic ecosystem, opening up significant legal risk for conference leadership.
In tort law, abstract harms are hard to quantify. But a signed, executed seven-figure NIL agreement from a collective or national brand provides a concrete, liquidated monetary metric for damages. If Greg Sankey forces LSU or any other program to keep a court-cleared athlete off the field, the affected player—and the corporate entities backing them—can sue the SEC for the exact dollar amount lost, multiplied by three under antitrust law.
Corporate brands are not likely to absorb heavy losses. When a local bank, auto group, or national apparel brand executes a six- or seven-figure agreement with an elite transfer player, they are paying for on-field exposure, Saturday television broadcasts on ABC, and activation during game weeks. Corporate legal teams will not sit back and write off a million-dollar loss to appease a conference commissioner's ideological feud. They could file claims for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations directly against the SEC and the individual university presidents who voted for the ban. In fact, Louisiana State law explicitly forbids any out-of-state athletic association, conference, or governing body from restricting, penalizing, or interfering with an athlete's ability to earn market-value NIL compensation while enrolled at a Louisiana institution. By passing an emergency rule aimed at preventing these athletes from taking the field—and thereby invalidating their active NIL deals—Sankey and the SEC presidents are in direct, intentional violation of Louisiana statutory law.
There has basically never been a single legal collision in American history that hits every single one of these hyper-specific pressure points simultaneously. A single legal battle where individual million-dollar labor assets, multi-billion-dollar broadcast networks, sovereign state governments, and a giant private corporate cartel are all simultaneously suing, countersuing, and threatening nuclear structural options is essentially unprecedented in American business history and jurisprudence.
By throwing a juvenile temper tantrum, Sankey has become the flashpoint for a cascade of events that could end in his own career demise and potentially the destruction of the thing he’s trying to protect.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:03 pm to somethingdifferent
It’s a conference move, you’ll get over it. The Big 12 has good teams.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:04 pm to JayAg
Not reading all that
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:11 pm to somethingdifferent
The Doctorate Board is reviewing your dissertation .
Thank You
Thank You
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:13 pm to Vecchio Cane
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:16 pm to somethingdifferent
I’ve seen some long posts on here but an entire series of 9 novels is a first
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:24 pm to GreyReb
although long, that was a great read! If it’s all accurate this will be entertaining for a very long time.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:28 pm to somethingdifferent
You wrote all that and the entire time it's not Sankey doing this, it's the other schools.
If Sankey was going rogue, they'd be discussing firing him.
If Sankey was going rogue, they'd be discussing firing him.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:30 pm to somethingdifferent
What he said ^. Might need you in Alabama tomorrow.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:34 pm to somethingdifferent
Exactly. I was just saying this to my assistant manager as I was salting the fries.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:38 pm to somethingdifferent
It’s lint and drawn out but the overall message is the. Regardless of what happens the SEC loses either way. And LSU does. Whole thing is a mess.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:54 pm to Boom33
quote:
You wrote all that and the entire time it's not Sankey doing this, it's the other schools.
He is the face of the other schools. If you had read the post, you would begin to understand what a dangerous can of worms the SEC has opened. You’re not understanding that all of these schools are arms of each state that funds them. At some point, this becomes an issue of eleven other states harming the ability of Louisiana to conduct its own business.
Posted on 9/8/26 at 11:55 pm to bluestem75
quote:
He is the face of the other schools. If you had read the post, you would begin to understand what a dangerous can of worms the SEC has opened. You’re not understanding that all of these schools are arms of each state that funds them. At some point, this becomes an issue of eleven other states harming the ability of Louisiana to conduct its own business.
LSU doesn't have a right to be a member of the SEC. The SEC can kick you out just because it doesn't like your colors if it wants.
Posted on 9/9/26 at 12:08 am to somethingdifferent
Holy crap, you AI'd or wrote that and declared the SEC loses? The SEC already won. LSU came to heel.
Posted on 9/9/26 at 10:18 am to GreyReb
quote:I know all those big words are difficult to understand. Let me see if I can find an episode of YoGabbaGabba for you...
Not reading all that
Posted on 9/9/26 at 10:21 am to somethingdifferent
Didn’t read let’s replace Sankey and all be friends again
It’s more fun when the SECR is just trolling over football and not trolling over conference ties
It’s more fun when the SECR is just trolling over football and not trolling over conference ties
Posted on 9/9/26 at 10:21 am to lsudave1
quote:Yeah, this was meant for grown ups. I knew the TikTok crowd would have trouble with all that.
I’ve seen some long posts on here but an entire series of 9 novels is a first
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