re: Is Anyone Aware of A Fight Between Ole Miss Fan/s and LSU Fan/s in Vaught Saturday Night?

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Was this assault better or worse than the Bama teabagger in the French Quarter? That was as real as it gets. Luckily the perpetrator was apprehended and arrested.

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Yep, because there were credible witnesses and video. Something that is strangely missing here.

At this point, based on Saturday’s incident report, it looks like there was a drunk/drugged coonass who needed medical assistance during the game. Another coonass saw him being wheeled away from the bathroom where he passed out/od’d/fell.

Past that I think it is most likely just LSU fans making up bullshite imaginary stories as a defense mechanism to help them cope with the loss to Ole Miss.

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you then be handed a beer

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Isn't that how all of this started?

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First, ..... I've heard of it.

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Ah ha ! So it's true !!!

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Blood takes hours if not days. Hell, they waited weeks for tox results from the kid that drowned on Horn Island July 4. Spitting out tox results on the day of are pretty foolish.

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That’s a good point.

Go ahead and slander the kid, I will offer to sue your gump arse for free bitch. Helping the lawyers in the stupid Nolan Wells case now.

You aren’t allowed to accuse someone of committing a felony or heinous crime, it’s negligence per se in Mississippi mfer. Google it.

You are allowed to offer an opinion as free speech but you are not allowed to slander anyone on the internet, in any public forum and you never have been, and people are starting to take action on this. I am already representing some doctors who have had enough of this shite and are going after everyone. Btw mfer slander/libel aka defamation is an intentional tort so not covered by any insurance program. You will pay for the defense lawyers in 5 or 10k chucks,


Do not slander people

What? Who is being slandered? I’m missing something.
Also, for what it’s worth the best defense for any slander/libel/defamation case is if whatever being said is, well…true. So the burden would hypothetically be on the “kid” who has not even been publicly identified, to reveal how he’s been “slandered.” Furthermore, you would also have to prove actual damages were made by said “defamation.” Private members of society usually have a higher chance at winning over public figures, so you’re right to a degree about how that can be pursued, but what you are describing wouldn’t hold up well if all you’re saying is a “bunch of anonymous dumbasses on a message board hurt someone anonymous person’s feelings for not believing they were a victim of a crime”—it is not enough to warrant anyone’s time, and again, not classified as true defamation because it boils down to: whose reputation has been hurt, there’s no name attached to this story?

My bro is an attorney and part of my concentration in college was communication law, so I tend to perk up when people reference this sort of thing because he and I chat about com law stuff frequently.

Alabama law is broadly similar to Mississippi law, and Alabama has particularly useful authority dealing directly with social-media defamation.

Alabama elements of defamation

The Alabama Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff generally must establish that the defendant was at least negligent in publishing a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff to another person, and that the statement was either actionable without proof of special harm (per se) or caused special harm (per quod). Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1091–92 (Ala. 1988).

In practical terms, the plaintiff ordinarily needs:

1. A false statement of fact;
2. Concerning or reasonably understood to concern the plaintiff;
3. Publication to at least one third person;
4. The required degree of fault—at least negligence in an ordinary private-person case, subject to constitutional limitations; and
5. Defamatory meaning plus damages, unless the statement is actionable per se.

Online statements absolutely can constitute defamation

Alabama has a particularly useful modern case: Flickinger v. King, decided by the Alabama Supreme Court in 2023. It involved Facebook posts, screenshots, sharing material with the plaintiff’s employer, and subsequent social-media commentary. The Court expressly analyzed whether the social-media material was false and defamatory.

The Court reiterated that written material can be defamatory when it tends to harm someone’s reputation, lower the person in the community’s estimation, or discourage others from associating or doing business with the person. It also recognized Alabama authority holding that a false written publication tending to subject someone to public hatred, contempt or ridicule can constitute libel.

So Facebook, X, Instagram, TikTok captions, blogs, websites, online reviews and similar written online communications can provide the publication for an Alabama libel claim.

Falsely accusing someone of a crime is especially important

This is where Alabama law becomes particularly relevant to the situation you previously asked me about.

The Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that falsely imputing the commission of a sufficiently serious criminal offense can constitute defamation per se.

In Nelson, the Court explained that accusing someone of an indictable crime involving infamy or moral turpitude is actionable per se. Because the defendant allegedly accused the plaintiff of stealing grain, the accusation of larceny qualified.

Similarly, in Delta Health Group, Inc. v. Stafford, 887 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 2004), the Alabama Supreme Court held that an accusation that the plaintiff had stolen building materials constituted slander per se.

That means an online statement such as:

“John Smith murdered someone.”

is fundamentally different from:

“I can’t stand John Smith.”

The first purports to assert an objectively verifiable fact—that Smith committed a serious crime. The second is ordinarily subjective opinion.

Consequently, falsely identifying someone as a murderer can present a very strong defamation-per-se issue under Alabama law, assuming the statement would reasonably be understood as a literal accusation rather than obvious hyperbole, satire, or figurative speech.

“In my opinion” doesn’t necessarily protect the speaker

Putting “I think,” “I believe,” or “in my opinion” in front of a factual accusation doesn’t automatically transform it into constitutionally protected opinion.

The important question is what an ordinary reader would understand the communication to mean.

For example:

“In my opinion, Smith is a horrible person.”

That’s largely subjective.

But:

“In my opinion, Smith is a murderer because he killed Jones.”

contains factual assertions capable of being proven true or false. Calling them an “opinion” doesn’t necessarily insulate the speaker.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s Flickinger decision says defamatory meaning is evaluated according to the meaning an ordinary or average reader or listener would ascribe to the communication.

Damages and defamation per se

This can be important in litigation.

When a communication is actionable per se, Alabama recognizes presumed injury to reputation. In Nelson, the Supreme Court explained that the plaintiff need not establish actual reputational or other harm to recover nominal or compensatory damages when the requirements for defamation per se are otherwise established.

Delta Health subsequently applied that principle to an accusation of stealing, holding that the plaintiff was relieved of proving actual harm to reputation or other actual damages.

There are constitutional limitations that can affect presumed and punitive damages, however, particularly where public figures or matters of public concern are involved.

Private person versus public figure

As in Mississippi, this distinction is critical.

For a public official or public figure, the constitutional New York Times v. Sullivan standard applies. The plaintiff must establish constitutional actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. Alabama expressly recognizes this distinction.

And “reckless disregard” is considerably more demanding than ordinary negligence. Alabama explains that the defendant must have actually entertained serious doubts about the truth or possessed a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.

For an ordinary private individual, the standard is substantially less demanding. Nelson states that the prima facie case requires the defendant to have been at least negligent.

Punitive damages

Alabama has a specific statute governing punitive damages for libel. Ala. Code § 6-5-186 imposes additional requirements and provides, among other things, that punitive damages require proof that the defendant published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity. The Alabama Supreme Court discusses the statute and its actual-malice requirement in Ivey v. State.

That means evidence such as these can become extremely important:

* Defendant was shown reliable evidence that the accusation was false but continued posting it;
* Defendant was directly told it was false;
* Defendant had no source for the accusation;
* Defendant deliberately avoided readily available contrary information;
* Defendant repeatedly published the accusation after receiving contrary evidence;
* Private messages reveal doubts about whether the accusation was true;
* Defendant encouraged others to repost the accusation;
* Defendant expanded the accusation after being challenged;
* Defendant targeted the person’s employer, clients, family, or professional associates.

Those facts can be relevant not merely to liability but potentially to malice, privilege, damages and punitive damages.

Sharing and screenshots

Another point from Flickinger is particularly interesting for an internet case: screenshots and redistribution matter.

The Alabama Supreme Court dealt directly with a situation in which social-media content and an allegedly counterfeit social-media profile were sent to the plaintiff’s supervising attorney. The Court recognized that even though some underlying content originated with the plaintiff, falsely presenting or altering the context surrounding that content presented a distinct issue.

So a defendant cannot necessarily escape liability by saying, “I only posted a screenshot.” What the defendant added, altered, represented, captioned, or communicated about that screenshot can matter.

er Louisiana law, a false online accusation that an identifiable person used illegal drugs can support a defamation claim. Whether it is defamation per se depends importantly on the exact wording and context—particularly whether the statement accuses the person of criminal conduct or, by its nature, seriously damages the person’s personal or professional reputation.

Louisiana’s elements of defamation

The leading Louisiana Supreme Court case is Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129 (La. 2004). Louisiana requires:

1. a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff;
2. unprivileged publication to a third person;
3. fault—negligence or greater—by the publisher; and
4. resulting injury.

The Louisiana Supreme Court defines defamatory words as those tending to harm someone’s reputation, lower that person in the community’s estimation, deter others from associating or dealing with the person, or expose the person to contempt or ridicule.

The illegal-drug accusation

Suppose someone posts on Facebook:

“John Doe was using cocaine Saturday night.”

If that statement is false, identifies John Doe, and is presented as something that actually happened rather than speculation or obvious rhetorical exaggeration, it is a factual assertion capable of being proven true or false.

That’s quite different from saying:

“John looked messed up to me.”

The second statement presents a much stronger opinion/interpretation issue. The first asserts a concrete fact: John used cocaine at a particular time.

It may constitute defamation per se

This is particularly significant in Louisiana.

Costello holds that statements that expressly or implicitly accuse another person of criminal conduct, or that inherently tend to injure the person’s personal or professional reputation, are considered defamatory per se.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed that rule in Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 935 So. 2d 669 (La. 2006). There, restaurant employees allegedly falsely accused a customer of passing counterfeit or unlawful currency. Because that amounted to an accusation of criminal conduct, the Court treated the accusation as potentially defamatory per se.

So the precise drug allegation matters. For example, falsely saying:

“Smith possessed cocaine.”

is an express accusation of criminal conduct and fits much more directly within Costello and Kennedy.

Saying:

“Smith used cocaine.”

also potentially implies criminal possession/use, but I would want to examine the exact words and circumstances before concluding that a Louisiana court would necessarily classify that particular statement as per se defamatory.

There’s an additional route: even apart from expressly accusing someone of a crime, Costello recognizes as per se defamatory statements that by their very nature tend to injure someone’s personal or professional reputation.

Why “per se” is important

This could make a major difference to the plaintiff’s proof.

The Louisiana Supreme Court says that once the plaintiff proves publication of words that are defamatory per se:

falsity and malice/fault are presumed, subject to rebuttal by the defendant, and injury may also be presumed.

For statements that are not defamatory per se, the plaintiff ordinarily has to establish falsity, fault and injury in addition to defamatory meaning and publication.

And Louisiana recognizes damages including injury to reputation, humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish, even without a specific loss of income, although competent evidence of the injuries is important.

Facebook and other social media count

There’s now useful Louisiana appellate authority directly involving Facebook.

In Jones v. Citizens for a New Louisiana (La. App. 1 Cir. 2025), the First Circuit considered allegedly defamatory Facebook posts and concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of success as to certain posts sufficient to defeat special motions to strike. The alleged injuries included reputational harm, contempt, ridicule, anxiety and emotional distress.

So publication does not have to occur in a newspaper or television broadcast. A Facebook post or comment seen by another person can constitute publication.

Pick your poison, it’s all the same. This is a huge area of growing law, they are going to sue 1000s of people on behalf of Nolan Wells friends over the next 5 maybe 10 years. Everyone that called or insinuated that the boys killed their friend will not only be sued by it will be slander per se and they will move just to damages. This includes Nancy Grace, Al Sharpton, Ben, the chick on the view down to random posters.

Look this is all entertainment. I start shite here for fun, you probably do too. In real life I am very different. The only thing I am deadly serious about is anyone that abuses or assaults children.

You can call me whatever bullshite you want etc, until we both get banned etc.

But you can’t accuse anyone of committing a crime unless you can defend it. We are all too loose with our words on social media, me included. But that’s coming to an end.

The fricking algorithms are the real problem here, in my opinion, They get people murdered. But Congress doesn’t want to do shite about it so this is where we are.

Good night