BugAC

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Just curious what has stopped Iran from obtaining the Uranium needed from the black market and or an ally like Russia or China?

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but I can kind of see Tusli as SoS for Vance

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. I think Vance would be more MAGA than Trump. And I'm not bashing Trump, I just pay a lot of attention to Vance over the last year, and currently, he seems to be much more America First. His interview with TPUSA was good once they got away from the Erika Kirk talk.

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To decorate? I mean do you expect blank walls everywhere you go?

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I must have missed “Zimbabwean Lives Matter”.

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Ah yes the guy who goes to an airport to you know, just get on a plane and go somewhere and not care about "messages" and "OMG IS THAT artwork from AFRICA, WHY!?"

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As opposed to some of you, who apparently will find anything on earth to complain about you dont agree with,

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probably stop at the artwork to pound some sand because it wasn't made in the USA

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get on here to type up an angry post about it

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and then get laughed at by folks like me.

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Thanks for the entertainment, at least. I'll be getting on my flight now...

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I dont give a sh*t because I'm there to fly somewhere.

Not ever going to look for stuff to get upset about because I'm 70 or find random things that dont matter to get upset about

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It's an airport. You use it to fly to places

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?? States have full authority to bind electors to their chosen candidate
?? This strengthens the idea that electors are agents of the state, not free actors

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While the Compact Clause is the most direct attack, critics sometimes combine it with:

Article II arguments that a state cannot constitutionally appoint electors based primarily on out-of-state votes (historical practice and Framers’ intent supposedly limit this).
Guarantee Clause (Article IV) claims that it undermines republican government.
Broader federalism/policy arguments that this is an unconstitutional “bypass” of the amendment process.

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Critics (notably law professor Norman R. Williams in his 2012 BYU Law Review article “Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is Unconstitutional,” among others) contend that while the text grants state legislatures broad (“plenary”) authority to choose the manner of appointing electors, that power is not unlimited and must be read in light of:

Framers’ intent and the structure of Article II: The Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected a direct national popular election for president. Instead, the Framers created the Electoral College as a compromise that preserved a federalist system—giving states (and especially smaller states) a meaningful role, with electors chosen in a way that reflected the sentiments and political character of each individual state. The process was designed to prevent large states or regional combinations from dominating through sheer population numbers. Appointing electors based on a national tally (i.e., giving decisive weight to out-of-state votes) is said to undermine this design by effectively turning the state’s electoral votes into a rubber stamp for the national popular vote winner, rather than a reflection of the state’s own people or political process.

Historical practice as evidence of original understanding: From ratification through the early decades of the republic (and ever since), no state has ever appointed its electors based primarily on votes cast by people outside its borders. States have used various methods—legislative appointment, statewide popular vote, district-based voting, etc.—but all have tied the choice, directly or indirectly, to the preferences of that state’s own citizens (or its legislature acting on their behalf). Uniform historical practice is often treated as strong evidence of constitutional meaning. Critics argue this consistent pattern shows that the “manner” contemplated by Article II, § 1, cl. 2 is limited to methods rooted in the state’s own electorate, not a national one. Extending it to out-of-state votes exceeds the delegated power.

In short, the argument is that while a state could (for example) let its legislature pick electors directly, or hold a statewide vote, or even use congressional districts, it cannot constitutionally delegate the substantive decision of who its electors support to the aggregate votes of non-residents across the country. Doing so allegedly transforms the state’s role in the Electoral College into something the Framers never authorized and deliberately avoided.

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As of April 2026, the NPVIC has not triggered (it needs 270 electoral votes committed). Virginia’s recent entry has increased momentum but left it short. If it ever reaches the threshold, lawsuits from non-compact states, candidates, or voters are widely expected, potentially reaching the Supreme Court. Outcomes would turn heavily on how the Court applies U.S. Steel and related cases to this unique context—particularly whether altering presidential election mechanics this way implicates “federal supremacy” or the horizontal balance among states.
In summary, Compact Clause challenges portray the NPVIC as a coordinated effort by some states to rewrite a fundamental national election rule without the supermajority consensus the Constitution demands for structural change. Proponents view it as a lawful exercise of each state’s independent Article II authority, with coordination not rising to the level of a forbidden compact. The debate remains unresolved by the courts and centers on deep questions of federalism and constitutional design.

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